Sometimes you simply have to acknowledge the help that has enabled you to achieve what you have. The reason this page starts with a picture of me is that this is a very personal thank you to every person listed here, whether by name or by position. When you write a book, whether non-fiction or fiction, it is traditional to acknowledge the people who helped you to make that achievement. Well, a website like this is in many ways a book. I have included a lot of materials that I have learned from other people, even if I only learned something negative. I would like to acknowledge many people who have helped me to achieve what I have.
I am very grateful to the following people. Some of these people will remain unnamed, either for reasons of confidentiality required by the casinos, or because what I learned from them was entirely negative in its nature. In these few cases, I am still grateful for the learning experience. These people know who they are. I still thank them.
My first Casino Manager, now deceased, at a club at North Lake Tahoe: He taught me not only all of the dealing procedures for the three basic games (much better than I learned in dealer school), but also taught me the reasons for every single game protection procedure. When working for this man, a long-term professional in his field, even at that time temporarily out of retirement, I also learned how to count cards at a professional level while dealing the game, talking the game, and protecting the game.
Tom, my first Casino Pit Boss, who taught me how
not to watch the games. He was probably the worst pit boss I ever had, and was almost as bad as some of the ones I later encountered in Las Vegas after I began working in Surveillance.
Don, also at my first club, who taught me how crooked some pit bosses are. His wife, one of our dealers, was almost as bad.
Jim Ward: my first Supervisor in Surveillance, who taught me one of the most necessary lessons for Surveillance personnel:
Look beyond the surface. He taught me that a fight in the bar could be a distraction for someone robbing the cage or cheating at the tables.
Thom: My first Surveillance manager, who taught me
all that a casino surveillance manager should not be. He was the one who directed us not to watch in the slots area, "because slots machines couldn't be cheated anymore." He was the one who used to go home in the afternoon and tell his Surveillance crew (we could not be called a team) to "stay out of trouble, and don't rock the boat."
Mike, who had an ambition to make a living by running adult websites. Mike taught me all about how necessary it was to doctor a composite tape, after he did crotch shots on a lady guest who fell down on the escalator. Thankfully, both of us survived this experience. (I can safely talk about this as it is long past the statute of limitations.)
Gary Powell: On nearly his first day as the Surveillance manager, after retiring from Nevada Gaming Control and several years as Surveillance/Security Manager and another few years as a successful consultant, I asked a question of Gary about Nevada Gaming Control law regarding cheating. Gary asked me what I wanted to know; I answered "All of it," to which he replied "good answer." He then proceeded, over the course of many years, to pass on everything he knew in the matters of gaming control, cheating, theft, and many other connected subjects. Gary never failed to provide the actual source of the information when asked, which is far different from many other people who have been my seniors. Most people (especially people at the Director level and above) hoard knowledge: Gary made sure that everyone around him at least had the opportunity to learn. Both his actions and his attitude in this matter have helped me to grow immensely, both professionally and personally. Gary is also in part responsible for my own attitude of learning something from every single person I meet or contact.
A director (who shall remain unnamed) that I worked for in the last quarter of 2001. He taught me most definitely how NOT to run a surveillance department. This person was attempting to run the entire casino as a dictatorship from his office in surveillance. He also would not accept offered training from anyone, despite the fact that his supervisors and operators (note I do not call them investigators) were untrained and ignorant of the methods of cheating the games. His casino got hit for many tens of thousands of dollars, some weeks after I offered training in the games being cheated,, and was told that my knowledge was not of any value. When I was showed a tape of the game being cheated, it took approximately ten seconds to identify the entire scam. I definitely thank this person for what I learned from him, despite the circumstances under which I quit.
A director (who again shall remained unnamed) that I worked under for three clubs all owned by an individual in downtown Las Vegas. This person taught me about what it means to work for a company when the top people are crooked. He taught me about ignoring the theft that was going on in the company, because it was "normal." The company bought its people's loyalty by allowing them to skim and steal, despite incompetence. It allowed theft and cheating, never notified the state agency of detected cheating and theft (because they didn't want NGCB in the joint) unless the person caught in the act of theft was stealing from one of its more valued (and "connected") patrons. This director and I did not get along, possibly because we were too much alike in many ways but with differing life viewpoints. I learned a lot from him, and I thank him.
Derk Boss: I worked under Derk for over four years, and there are few people in the business I respect as much. Derk taught me about the dangers of internal theft: I had been aware of this before, but Derk brought it home to me how very prevalent it is in the casino industry, and especially he taught me a lot about how to prevent and detect internal theft when it was occurring. Derk also provided some real basics in surveillance and especially in the gathering of evidence, that I had not learned in seven years in the business before working for him. Derk is one of the most influential people in the business, and I thank him very deeply for helping me to achieve what I have.
Rob: One of my supervisors when I worked under Derk. Rob taught me a little bit of humility, and he taught me that I should not always expect the same level of formal learning in all areas that I had achieved. He taught me that sometimes you have to cut back on the advanced vocabulary (which I had achieved in an earlier career, and which I still maintain as a writer) in order to get the point across when writing reports. Rob also taught me a lot about keeping my damn opinions and conclusions out of my reports. I thank him for the year or so we worked together before he got promoted out of the area.
Angel: Another of my supervisors when I worked under Derk. Angel is probably just exactly what his name says. He is never vindictive (one of the prevailing characteristics of most surveillance people), but is one of the most tenacious people I have ever come across: Once he has a target, he does not let go. But even more important, Angel taught me that sometimes you just have to sit down and suffer through a long and dull investigation. Thank you Angel.
Another Surveillance manager who shall remain unnamed. Though I have a lot of respect for this person, what I learned from him was in fact a few of the things that a manager should not do. This is very possibly because I had been so lucky with a couple of earlier bosses who taught me the right way. I learned the dangers of micromanagement. I learned the dangers of rushing things, all over again (I had learned it in an earlier career, but had to get it pushed in my face a couple times for this career too). I learned from this person the most important lessons about accepting investigations into surveillance that were at best a waste of investigator time, and I learned about how NOT to set priorities, which set me in the path about how to set priorities properly. This person taught me most about the value of the Surveillance manager or supervisor being able to say "NO," and about running too many investigations simultaneously.
Through no fault of his own, he taught me about the problems of running a seriously undermanned Surveillance department. I thank him, and if we had worked together earlier in my career, I believe I would have learned more positive things from our time working with each other, because despite the negative things I learned, he was a very competent manager, overall.
From another manager in this same time period, again through no fault of his own, I learned about the dangers of having too many people working together to compile evidence in a criminal case, and what it does to the final report and presentation of evidence. I learned from this person about the amount of pressure on a manager to get reports and evidence presentation completed with too short a deadline. (We are still waiting, almost five years later, for the final civil suit on this case.) Thanks very much.
I also thank all of the cheats, scammers, internal thieves, external thieves, bullshit artists, scumbags, advantage players and others I have "busted" over the years, because every single one of you taught me something.
You will notice that though there is a list there,
each category is separate. I am NOT lumping you together. I learned about that from a man named Bob, who writes books about the law as it applies to the casino industry.
And most of all, I thank the Creator for the ability and inclination to learn from every experience, the ability to accept what is given in life, and the situations that have forced me out of my complacency into learning something I had not known before.
And thank all of you who read this for your attention. It was written over the Thanksgiving weekend, and I thought that I should thank all those who have contributed to my Gaming Surveillance career.
