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Available in Russian Translation
Chain of Command Surveillance Room By
Jim Goding
A chain of command is the series of positions in an organization through which reports and orders or requests for action are correctly routed. An
example close to home is 1. Report originator: Surveillance Investigator 2. Surveillance Supervisor 3. Surveillance Director 4. Controller or General Manager 5. (then down to) Casino Manager (or Slots Director, Security Director,
etc.) 6. Casino Shift Manager (etc.)
There are two types of chain of command with which we are concerned in the Surveillance Room: the chain inside Surveillance, and all chains of command in other departments. Within
the room, our concern with chain of command is very simple. First, no one
outside our own chain of command passes orders to the Surveillance Room.
This does not mean that we do not cooperate fully with other departments, only
that orders into the room must be passed through our own chain of command. It also means that certain things are simply not done without approval of the Surveillance Director. Original Tapes are not released to anyone, including enforcement agencies, without approval of the Director, or in the case where he cannot be reached, a Surveillance Supervisor. Dub tapes are not made and released without at least informing the Director. Special observations require the approval of the Director, and release of any information about the Surveillance Room, as well. Any information in writing goes out via the Director. That means that any order or request into the Surveillance Room to release information recorded in the Surveillance Room must pass through the Director. Supervisors have the authority to handle releases only when the Director cannot be reached, and only then in situations of urgency, such as arrests, when originals must be released to law enforcement agencies. Internal matters having to do with Surveillance personnel must pass through our chain of command. Complaints, bright ideas, suggestions, requests for changes in personnel situations (such as schedules, shifts, vacations), pass through the Supervisors to the Director. Ideally, if an investigator wants the Director to see a suggestion, he should write it down and give it to his shift supervisor, who will then pass it on to the Director, unless it is completely off company policy. He may want to go over such a suggestion with the originator, perhaps refining it or making it more viable. He may want to incorporate it into a larger package, or use it to back up something that is already being worked out. Unfortunately, verbal suggestions most often get forgotten, and are seldom taken seriously. If you have a good idea, a suggestion for improvement of our department, the best way to get it to the attention of the people who can act on it is to submit it in writing through the chain of command. Supervisors should be careful to attribute suggestions to the originator. Taking credit for a suggestion made by another is unfair, and is in fact a bit of a betrayal. Such an action undermines the Supervisor's position with his juniors, and when later found out about by seniors, reduces the Supervisor's credibility. Outside Chains of Command Outside areas have their own chains of command as well, and it is vital to the proper functioning of our department and others that these be respected. Just as the surveillance investigator does not accept orders from outside the department, it is necessary that our own flow of information be directed to the proper terminals. Verbal requests for immediate correction of problems in the Pit is a good example: A wheel dealer isn't waving off bets before the ball drops. This is a serious problem that has potential of costing the casino a lot of money. A report of a situation like this must go to someone who actually has authority to act to correct it, and possibly (on their own authority, not ours) to do a "personnel correction," involving training or disciplinary action to the dealer. Immediate correction of the problem would fall to the Casino Shift Manager. However, a report of the situation would also travel through lines (up through the Controller, General Manager, down to the Casino Manager to the Shift Manager). Several such reports would point up to the executives a real situation requiring more major correction. The investigator would report the problem to his supervisor, who would then contact at least a Pit Supervisor (not a floorman), and probably the Casino Shift Manager. A report would be made to the Director of Surveillance; minimum report would be an explanatory entry in the daily log. More serious situations, that could involve criminal prosecution, serious discipline or termination--such as detection of a dealer going south with checks or cash--would be reported, first and immediately, to our own Director, as it involves gathering of evidence for a possible prosecution. The Director, once evidence was gathered, would then report through command channels (Controller or General Manager, Director of Security, outside enforcement agency). Such a situation carries with it major liability, and the senior executives MUST be kept informed, as they are responsible for decisions and actions taken. Only by acting on full information can correct decisions be made. Surveillance does not necessarily have access to all information provided to senior executives, just as other departments are not privy to all information about the Surveillance Room. Consider how you would feel if someone outside the department started moving your cameras around without telling you: Several of your game cameras are left focused in on slot areas, and you haven't been informed. Then someone asks you what happened on a game and you find the hardwired VCR has been recording a slot machine or an aisle. Someone without correct knowledge interfered in your area of responsibility, made decisions about what should or should not be recorded, and left your tail hanging out in the breeze. Yet you are still responsible. Know Neighboring Command Channels It is the responsibility of Investigators and Supervisors to understand and follow the command lines of departments we work with. Supervisors in other departments have the right to make the decisions regarding the activities of their own personnel. Just as importantly, supervisory personnel have the authority to act in situations where action is required. For instance, a security officer does not have the authority to detain an individual, except in certain specific situations. Security Dispatch cannot order that someone be detained or 86ed. That authority resides in the Security Supervisors and Security Shift Manager, or in the managers in other departments such as Slots or Casino (Pit). Therefore, there is no shortcut involved in reporting (for example), a slot-credit claimer to Security Dispatch. In order for effective action to be taken, such as an 86 on the individual, a Security Supervisor has to make the decision. Remember also that in many casinos, it is not within the authority of Surveillance personnel to order action, only to observe and report. It is vital that reports go to the correct positions, through proper channels. The responsibility for any action taken lies with the person to whom it is reported. Our duty ends with supplying information to the correct people, through correct channels. Effective reporting of information must include correct choice of speed of report (i.e., emergency versus routine) as well as correct routing. Bypassing Chain of Command Surveillance Investigators and Supervisors who bypass chain of command are actually, whether intentionally or not, sabotaging the effectiveness of all of our work. Incorrect reporting calls all reports into question and damages the reputation of our Surveillance Room. Without a reputation of effectiveness, none of our work does any good, as all reports will tend to be either questioned or ignored altogether. Therefore bypassing the chain of command carries the same penalties as false reporting. Bypassing chain of command, done unnecessarily, requires a warning. Habitual or intentional bypassing of chain of command is a termination offense, whether within the department or outside it. Intentionally
keeping one's supervisor ignorant of information pertaining to casino
surveillance is a termination offense.
Copyright © 1999, 2002 by Jim Goding. All rights reserved. Duplication in any form, electronic or otherwise, without the express written permission of the author is forbidden, is a violation of the proprietary rights of the author and is actionable under law. This article may be purchased for a nominal fee by clicking on the following link.
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