January 2010
Welcome to Casino Surveillance News, the first online trade letter for Casino Surveillance and Security.
Happy New Year, all.
Casino Surveillance News is now beginning, with this issue, its ninth continuous year of operation. We are still here, we are still surviving, and we have a totally new outlook on serving our clients.
CSN News:
Advertisers, please be patient. You will be up and running, with your home links active, before the end of the month. I am still preparing to deliver my new product, the PERMANENT SOLUTION to training casino Surveillance and Security, and there are a few more things I have to get done.
The new product is ready, but I am enhancing it: The Casino Surveillance and Security Training program class presentations will all be delivered exactly as I have always done in the classroom: Each presentation is to be accompanied by audio voice-over commentary and narrative, explanations of the video, pointers from twenty years of casino experience, clarifications, examples and “war stories.” I expect within a few more days to have all of the classes ready to go so that a purchaser can have it delivered within a week.
I have split the newsletter into two parts and made some other changes. Subscribers will still receive the entire newsletter as email. It will still be posted on the website. However, the NEWS ONLY portion will in future be posted at this address: http://casinosurveillancenews.com/newsletter-2
This means that you no longer have to skim my opinions in order to reach the news, if you don’t want to.
The CSN News, and any further editorial opinions I wish to express, will also be posted on my blog at this address: http://www.casinosurveillancetraining.com/
In addition, I have taken the Casino Security Training program–basic training in casino security–and posted it on a new site: http://www.casinosecuritytraining.com/ This program was very successfully delivered twice in 2008 and 2009, and I have configured it for training from computer. This too will be delivered exactly as it was in the two very successful seminars, with voice over commentary and narration and explanations of the videos involved. Additional materials have been added. Unfortunately there is one part of the “Concealed Weapons” class that needs to be delivered by a live person, and I am currently working out how to do this without having to come to your casino for delivery. (This one was awkward anyway, as there were several things I would have had to bring that generally made TSA very nervous when I packed them in my bags; forget carry-on. You have no idea what carrying stuff like this does when you are traveling by air.)
Advertisers please send me any new logos and links, and I will have you back up in a minimum time. Please be advised that CSN still occupies the top position on page 1 of a Google search for “Casino Surveillance,” and
WE STILL SET THE STANDARDS FOR TRAINING OF CASINO SURVEILLANCE
and for
BASIC SECURITY TRAINING FOR CASINOS
* * *
Keynote Article: I have updated this article from the original written in 2003, in light of several more years of casino Surveillance experience and several more years of experience in training Surveillance, Security and Gaming Regulation staff, as well as to bring it into present time regarding technology.
Teamwork Part IV
Surveillance as an Income-Producing Department
By Jim Goding
In budget meetings and fighting for upgrade funding, even in getting the funds together to meet minimum legal requirements, corporate political infighting will often produce the statement that “Surveillance does not produce income.” The same statement has been made, over and over through the years, regarding Security and also the Compliance and Inspection sections of tribal gaming regulation agencies.
Needless to say, this statement is false. However, it is not often obvious to people outside this field exactly how these areas produce income for the organization. I will attempt to show in this article how these investigation and inspection areas actually produce income, and also why it is not often apparent to people in the normal operations areas.
The short answer, of course, is through teamwork with other departmental managers. The income produced by a properly equipped and trained Surveillance department shows up as increased income in the Pit, Slots, Retail, Food and Beverage, and in massive savings on legal fees and settlement costs as well as saving money from fines from regulatory agencies, increased insurance premiums and other costs that don’t occur when an inspection or investigation department is fully trained and proactive.
This only works well if teamwork is active, however. Often, the best way to get other managers to work with Surveillance information is to show how their income could be increased. Once this starts working, it even sometimes happens that the budget infighting cuts down over Surveillance costs. (It will never, of course, go away entirely.)
Let’s take a look at a few examples; we will look at examples from the most visible departments. These can also be used as typical examples for other areas, especially the internal theft threats. Monetary damages alone from these can be extrapolated.
Slots: A slots cheat (external theft); a crooked floorperson (internal theft); and a crooked change booth cashier (internal theft).
Table Games: A cheating dealer (internal theft); an advantage player (external threat); and procedural errors by dealers (customer service).
Security assistance: A safety violation (potential lawsuit); a distract-and-grab team (threat to customers); and an under-trained Security Officer (potential lawsuits).
Slots:
The Slots Cheat: This person operates by various means, including devices such as optics, which fool the payout counter, and devices which can reprogram the central processing unit of a slot machine. More modern devices communicate directly to the credit meter on the machine, fooling it into granting far more credits at the touch of a button.
The first is less expensive to the casino. The cheater uses the device to empty the coin hopper of a slot machine and then exits the area. Let’s say that each time he uses the device, it costs the Slots department one fill bag: $300 in quarters, for example. Now, if the person finds, by getting away with it, that he can make $300 each time he comes into the casino, he will return many times, perhaps twenty times over the course of year. That comes to $6000, for a single slots cheat, for one year. However, if this person is detected and apprehended, or even scared away by the attention brought on him by a well-equipped Surveillance department working in tandem with an educated Slots department, that is $6000 in savings.
In actual fact, that is a conservative estimate: in a single visit to a well-known casino, one cheat using such a device emptied three machines before leaving the area, a minimum of $900 in one visit. A device essentially identical to the one he used brought a black-market price of over $25,000. What does that say it was expected to produce?
Another major casino was hit four times in two years for over $30,000 each time by a team of people who were reprogramming the computer chip that determined when a large jackpot was to pay. This was only possible because (1) the Surveillance department was crippled by being under-equipped, having no or ineffective coverage over the slot banks concerned, and (2) the Surveillance and Slots departments did not work together, and in fact were discouraged by management from doing so.
The crooked floor person: This person has a variety of ways to operate. Fill bags, at $200 to $400 each, can disappear off the floor. Or the person can simply pour fill bags into a conspirator’s bucket, splitting the proceeds. The thing to remember is that such a person never does his scam only once: it will continue to occur, over and over, as long as the person feels he can get away with it, which means until he is caught.
So, again, let’s take a conservative estimate: Say he sends out only two false fills per week, at $300 each. That’s $31,200 a year. And of course, that assumes that only one person is doing it, which is a false assumption: If a department is operating in such a way that one person can get away with stealing, others are doing it as well, and it may reach well into the departmental supervisory level and above.
Jackpot amounts can be falsely overridden, for relatively small amounts, a couple hundred at a time. We have seen all of these, and more expensive ones as well. One Slots supervisor at a relatively minor off-strip Las Vegas property took the casino for over $2 million in less than two years before being detected. A Slots manager in Arizona took his casino for over a million bucks before being detected.
In the case of the Las Vegas property, that casino was unwilling to pay Surveillance operators the going rate, and as a result, their Surveillance staff were either completely inexperienced or were rejects from other casinos where they had not been able to make the grade. This casino, for reasons of its own, did not want trained Surveillance investigators. (I once applied there myself, turned down the job offered because they were unwilling to pay even standard starting wages for Surveillance though I had several years of experience at that time. Another investigator I know who had worked there had been released when he detected an internal theft scam by investigating internal control violations.)
Each of the examples here involved people who were caught doing these exact actions. In each case, a well-equipped and trained Surveillance department operating as a team with senior Slots Management may have caught them much sooner, saving major amounts of money for the company.
The crooked cashier: This, at first look, is generally considered to be petty theft. However, its consequences are much more far-reaching than the immediate theft at which the person is finally caught. To begin with, a crooked cashier generally steals a small amount of money, usually from the customers, amounting to, at most, $40-100 a day. He or she generally rationalizes it as an increase in pay. They may not make that much every day; let’s average it at $15 a day, five days a week, or $75 per week. That comes to $3900 per year.
However, the consequences of this are much more far-reaching. In actual fact, many people do realize they have been short-changed, and are either too timid to say anything or just don’t think it is worth the trouble to complain. However, they don’t come back. And it is very common for Joe Bloke from Peoria to tell his friends and relatives that he was short-changed by the slots cashier at such and such a casino, and this will keep those people from ever showing up. You can consider that for each displeased customer, at least five future customers will never come to your casino.
But let’s just ignore that for the purposes of this article: We’ll figure that only two of the cashiers in this hypothetical loosely-run Slots Department are stealing, say two slots floorpeople, and if is a fairly large casino, let’s say two slot cheaters of the less expensive variety are operating on a regular basis, using something like an optic device or one of the more modern equivalents.
With these alone, we are looking at preventing or detecting and stopping over $80,000 per year in lost income for the slots department. It is common for a Surveillance department, once it begins to be properly equipped and trained and work as a team with the Slots and Security departments, to find literally dozens of examples of these losses, as well as many other types, within the first year. After that, its presence and reputation actually prevents such activity from occurring.
Table Games:
The Cheating Dealer: Let’s take an example I have seen in a major Las Vegas Casino. Because procedures in the Pit were very lax, the dealer had worked out a way of slipping cash from customer buy-ins into his shirt. On the night he was arrested, this dealer had over $800 in cash that had been taken from customers stashed in his shirt. He in fact confessed to having averaged $300 per day for the last year when confronted with Surveillance videos of his most recent thefts. Just in one year, this dealer had taken $75,000 directly from the casino’s income, and that is just what he confessed to.
Of course, with procedures and supervision this lax in the casino, we know that this dealer was not alone. (I know of at least two other dealers who were busted for theft or cheating in that casino over the course of the two years I worked in that pit.) Since there were over 200 dealers working, probably only a few of them stealing, and not all of those working as profitable a scam as this one, let’s say there was “only” another $75,000 per year in lost income. This is in fact a very conservative figure: In another casino with approximately the same betting limits where I worked, two dealers were busted for theft off the crap tables, and each day they were taking out $3-400.
The Advantage Player: The amount of money lost to advantage players such as card counters and shuffle trackers tends to strike fear into the hearts of senior Pit personnel. Of course, not all advantage players win. However, they tend to return, again and again to the same casino, until stopped. One team that was caught in Las Vegas was betting quite high on favorable decks, and after only half an hour of play had won nearly $40,000. This was the fourth visit by these particular players, and on each of their previous visits they had won between $10,000 and $50,000. Of course, these boys were the cream of the crop. Smaller, singleton players will often elect to be less conspicuous. Over the course of five years, I caught counters who had been working the casinos for extended periods of time. Some even had comp accounts. One was located by noting that he had been five times to the casino that year and had never lost a dollar, but in fact had profited $6-8,000 per visit. On his next visit, his play was analyzed and he was found to be a very skilled advantage player, and barred from further play on blackjack.
In preventing return visits by advantage players, in catching them when they return anyway, a skilled Surveillance department pays its salaries many times over. In one of the major casinos spoken of, by extrapolating how many times the teams would return in one year and how much money (by conservative estimates, as above) they would have taken according to their past record, the skilled Surveillance personnel saved the casino over $400,000 per year.
Procedural Errors: This is a bit more difficult to analyze in terms of dollars, and we will not add any figures in. However, procedural errors by dealers cost the casino many customers, and that, of course, is very expensive in terms of dollars, both in dollars never dropped and in customers who leave before they otherwise would, losing their money in another casino and telling their friends where they actually had fun.
The way it works is this: Dealers who habitually violate procedures are those with low skills and low morale. They appear unprofessional: not spreading cards, correcting their own errors, argumentative, and sloppy. They are the most likely, because of their low morale, to hustle tokes and otherwise offend customers by their attitude. In addition, dealers who are sloppy in procedure ATTRACT cheats, thieves and other types that are not the desired customers of the casino. One of the first things that a cheat looks for in scouting a territory is dealers who are sloppy in their procedures: Sloppy procedures make it much easier for the cheat and thief to operate.
In contrast, dealers who are well trained and supervised feel good about their work, feel good about their customers, make money in tips and make money for the casino by keeping the players at the table for longer times and more buy-ins. A professional staff attracts players and keeps them at the tables whether the players are winning or losing, because the players are being entertained. That, in fact, is what players really come to the casino for—at least the players that the casino wants.
A well-trained and well-equipped Surveillance Department, through its remote supervision of the Pits and correct reporting on command lines, keeps the Supervisors and dealers on their toes and corrects dangerous and sloppy violations of correct games procedure before they become habitual. This enhances the security, image and morale of the Pit, increasing their income and viability through better customer service.
Enforcement of procedures also discourages potential dishonesty by staff by making theft difficult; dishonest employees will depart for another area. In the first casino in which I worked Surveillance, one procedure correction enforced over an array of nine games raised the hold percentage on those games by a full point. In addition, one of the dealers on those games left for another casino immediately after the memo came down from the GM on that procedural point. That dealer was a few weeks later apprehended in a cheating/collusion scam that had cost the casino over $30,000 in a single night. It is unknown how many times this dealer had pulled the same scam on a smaller scale. The procedure corrected was the spreading of cards so they could be read by supervisors and surveillance.
Security and Other Parts of the Casino
Safety Violations: Some of these would curl your hair if you saw them. I have seen (as mentioned in other articles) some of the most truly stupid actions by staff, with potential costs in the millions of dollars. Let’s just take two that I saw in a single casino in the space of one month.
The first was a casino housekeeper, or porter, who was vacuuming the casino floor late at night in the area of an escalator that led down to one of the sets of restrooms. This person had, completely unthinkingly, worked his way from one side of the escalators to the other, and in the course of his work had actually stretched the black power cord for his vacuum cleaner across the opening to the escalators. It was stretched across at ankle height on the down escalator and at knee height on the up side.
Now, consider this from the point of view of a civil lawyer. First off, late at night in the casino, many patrons are inebriated to greater or lesser extent, and mostly on liquor that is provided “free” by the casino. The path to the bathroom had a tripwire, in effect, stretched across it by the unthinking (negligent) actions of a casino employee. There were no warning signs (negligence) and the power cord was black and nearly invisible (violation of safety rules: it should have been orange and highly visible, negligence again).
What happens when someone on the way to the bathroom trips over that “invisible” cord? If they survive the fall, they sue the casino for potentially hundreds of thousands of dollars in hospital bills, lawyer fees and punitive damages, because of the negligence by staff and by management who should have provided better safety training and enforced standard safety regulations.
This particular error was caught by an alert Surveillance agent during a routine scan of the casino and corrected immediately by teamwork with Security BEFORE an accident occurred. As a result of the report filed by Surveillance, the staff member involved was corrected and received proper safety training, along with several other employees.
Let’s be conservative here, and say that the cost of an accident there would have been roughly $200,000 in hospital bills and attorney fees, settled out of court. This is not an unreal figure. Though the actual money would have been covered by company liability insurance, the premiums would have been raised because of the staff negligence and lack of safety training.
The second example of safety violation happened less than a month later. A cleaner was observed standing on top of a slot machine with a rounded top, hanging on to the electrical sign by one hand, and dusting the tops, between machines and around the sign using a backpack vacuum cleaner. The cord for the vacuum was stretched across a major aisle between a Pit and the slots area, at floor level on one side and chest level at the other. There were no warning signs.
A customer entangling himself in that cord could not only have tripped and fallen (potential injury) but could also have pulled the worker down from a precarious (and illegal) perch on the slot machine, injuring the worker and possibly pulling down also the electrical sign, with other potential injuries involved there, plus the relatively minor cost of repairs.
This is another potential $100,000 in fines (for safety regulations: no ladder, standing on the machine unsupported, no warning signs, power cord across walkway with no barriers), attorney fees, hospital bills, plus increased insurance premiums and state worker’s compensation insurance.
Again, an alert Surveillance agent working as a team with Security and Housekeeping prevented a potentially very expensive accident. Human Resources contributed, because of these two instances, with increased safety training.
Distract and Grab Teams: Distract thieves victimize your guests. They operate in your casino, steal from your players and cut into your current and future income.
A trained Surveillance and Security staff, working together as a team, can PREVENT distract and grab operations by creating a Security presence, in place and targeted at the thieves themselves, that prevents them from operating.
Let’s take a look at the way these teams actually hurt the casino.
First, a person who gets stolen from in your casino deprives it of the income that would have been generated directly from what the person stole. If he takes credits from a guest’s slot machine by distracting him or her, then he has stolen approximately 80% of the money that ticket represented from the casino. This takes into account the amount that would most likely be played back into the machines, offset against the possibility that the player would have cashed it and left the casino. So if the distract thief steals a TITO worth $50, the casino has directly lost approximately $40 to the thief.
More important, however, is the fact that, no matter your customer service and policies regarding returning money to players that have been stolen from, the casino is going to lose future trade. First off, even if the money is returned to the player who was victimized, that player will remember that it was YOUR CASINO where they had their money stolen.
If it was personal property stolen, such as a purse or jacket with a wallet in it, it is much worse. You can’t return the ID, the credit cards have to be canceled, the woman’s personal belongings are gone, and her privacy has been seriously invaded. You really have no idea how much this affects a person until you have had it happen to you.
This person will not return to your casino. Worse, when they go home, they will tell others what happened: Mabel the town gossip, the local barber, the boys at the bar, the bridge club and garden club and the social circle at the local church are all going to hear about how the guest got ripped off at _________ casino. YOU LOSE FUTURE TRADE. An informal study done on this in the late 1990s came up with the figure of ten future customers lost for each time someone got ripped off in your casino or hotel. I prefer conservative figures, so I talk about losing five future guests for each theft from a patron.
It gets much worse if the story makes it to the media and gets reported on the evening news.
Surveillance, working as a team with Security, can at times apprehend these thieves. More importantly, by reviewing recordings and getting ID on the thieves themselves, Surveillance can inform Security when these people return (which they always do until caught or the heat comes on), identify them for Security, get them run out when they return or simply put on the heat and make the place undesirable as a working environment for thieves. Prevention is a very powerful tool. Most of these people will depart immediately if confronted by a Security officer who knows what they do. Often the only thing needed is eye contact by a uniformed or suited Security officer. This is made possible by ID photos and communication with Surveillance.
The Untrained Security Officer: This person carries a potentially very heavy liability, and in fact may only be detected by Surveillance cameras and crew. In one casino, a new and poorly trained Security officer, ordered to escort an inebriated customer out, in fact frog-marched the customer to the door and forcibly pushed him out, resulting in the customer falling on his face and injuring himself.
Though in this case no lawsuit resulted, the Security Supervisor for the shift was unaware of the potential problem employee until notified by Surveillance. A single instance of this casual brutality could cost the company hundreds of thousands of dollars, even if no serious injury resulted. Added to that would have been the fact that this customer had been served complimentary liquor beyond the point where he was visibly intoxicated, which is a violation of state law. The casino could have lost its liquor license or been fined heavily by gaming regulation on this point alone, even without the injury and misconduct by the untrained security officer.
But let’s take a more prosaic example: underage gamblers. In Las Vegas at this time, it can cost the casino $10,000 per instance of being caught by Gaming Control allowing minors to gamble. Let’s say that the new security officer doesn’t understand that it is a part of his duties to be alert for underage gamblers, and to check ID’s and persuade minors to leave the casino. (And believe me, there are a lot of officers who will commonly walk right by obvious minors while on patrol: I have seen it hundreds of times.) That can be a very, very expensive error of ignorance. However, if detected and reported to Security management by an alert and well-equipped Surveillance crew, this liability can be handled at virtually no cost.
Summary
As we have seen, the monetary damages from any of the threats above is enough to justify major improvements in surveillance capabilities (equipment and training) or adding staff to the Surveillance department. The trick is that the income or saving of assets is, without exception, produced in an area other than Surveillance. This creates an apparency that the income produced is in Slots, Pit, or Legal, when in fact the producers of the income were a well-equipped and well-trained, competent Surveillance team, working in tandem with other areas and with Management.
The other important part to consider is that, according to survey, a major portion of losses due to theft in casinos are a result of internal theft outside the Pit and Slots areas. This, in addition to prevention of potential losses due to safety violations and regulatory fines, creates a major income source in a competent and equipped Surveillance Department.
The entire point of this article, though, is that in fact an untrained and inexperienced Surveillance department is not equipped to pick up many of the examples I have given here. They do not have the knowledge of the scams, internal and external, that they need in order to pick up the scams. An untrained department does not correctly write or route reports, and executives discount the reports they do receive. When illegal activity is detected they may not know what evidence must be maintained or how to maintain it for presentation in court. Without knowledge of procedures in the rest of the casino, or what those procedures are designed to control and prevent, cheating and internal theft can run out of control.
Untrained Surveillance can be as much of a liability to the casino as the untrained Security officer mentioned above. Confidentiality breaks, actions advised because of misunderstandings of the law, poor handling of evidence and reports that cannot meet the standard that would be required in court actions can cost the casino major portions of casino income. I know of one case in which a poorly trained Surveillance person advised a rookie gaming control investigator that a person was cheating by bending cards, when in fact the person was engaged in taking advantage of a poorly trained dealer who was exposing the hole card. The resulting arrest cost the casino over $150,000, because the video evidence in fact did not show any cheating moves, but did show that the dealer was exposing the hole card.
A trained and effective Surveillance, Security department and trained and competent gaming regulatory area are assets to the casino and its owners. Untrained or poorly trained personnel, in any department, are a liability to the casino in terms of lost customers, lost assets, potential legal problems and fines from regulatory agencies.
Copyright © 2003, 2009 by Jim Goding. All Rights Reserved. Unauthorized sale or distribution is a violation of law and of the proprietary rights of the author, and is actionable under law. Inquire with jimgoding@casinosurveillancenews.com
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It’s News Time:
(I will supply text of the news article if any of these links do not work. Email to inquiry@casinosurveillancenews.com)
Busts and Scams:
A man was sentenced to five years probation after pleading guilty to cheating at gambling in an Iowa casino. His offense was moving his wagers from the Pass line to Don’t Pass after the point was established on a craps game. After repeated warnings from staff, Iowa state police investigated his activities and arrested him on a warrant. See the stories at this link and also here
The Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board fines the operators of the Meadows Racetrack and Casino a total of $10,000 for allowing minors to gamble and for allowing a self-excluded person to obtain a player card. See the story
High-rolling gambler Harry Kakavas has lost his $35 million case against Melbourne’s Crown Casino and may yet be forced to repay the casino $1 million. Kakavas had sued the Australian casino for a portion of his losses, claiming that the casino enticed him to play despite the fact he had placed himself on an exclusion list for problem gamblers. See the story
A cleaning employee at the Iowa Waterloo casino has been arrested after items were taken from rooms at the hotel. See the story
A Missouri man pleaded guilty to stealing from an Oklahoma casino by creating counterfeit gambling chips. He admitted bleaching legitimate 25-cent chips and then dying them to match the casino’s $500 chips. See the story
Nevada’s Gaming Control Board has opened a separate investigation into whether Harrah’s violated gambling regulations, based on allegations made by high-roller Watanabe, who lost over $127 million in 2007, and who claims that Caesars and the Rio plied him with liquor and pain medication as part of a systematic plan to keep him gambling. See the story
Other News:
Melbourne’s Crown Casino has hit back at a 2007 police report obtained under the freedom of information laws, which has detailed over 3000 crimes committed at the casino during a three year period. See the story
A French court reached a decision on two former friends who won a casino’s £2 million slot jackpot, but fell out as to how the money would be divided. See the story
That’s all for this month, Folks.
